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Four courses of action for sixty warheads

closed briefing · wire record · 3 February 2026, 18:00 · The Situation Room

At 18:00 on Tuesday in the White House Situation Room, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and senior planners from the Joint Staff and U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) formally delivered the classified memorandum *Operational Options and Custodial Risk Matrix: Forward-Deployed Nuclear Weapons in the European Theater* to the President.

The thirty-eight-page assessment, compiled under the direction of USSTRATCOM Commander Gen. Anthony Cotton and acting operational directors in the Pentagon, laid bare the acute tactical and strategic dilemma confronting roughly four hundred personnel of the U.S. Air Force 701st, 702nd, and 703rd Munitions Support Squadrons (MUNSS). Following the European Council's asset freeze and Washington’s silence toward NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s diplomatic demarche, German *Feldjäger*, Dutch *Koninklijke Marechaussee*, and Belgian federal military police have effectively established armed ring perimeters around Büchel, Volkel, and Kleine Brogel air bases, barring U.S. cargo flights and placing host-nation air-traffic holds on all non-cleared movements.

Inside the bases, approximately sixty to one hundred B61-3, B61-4, and modernized B61-12 thermonuclear gravity bombs remain locked inside underground Weapons Storage and Security System (WS3) vaults within hardened aircraft shelters. While the weapons are secured behind U.S.-controlled Permissive Action Links (PAL) and electronic vault interlocks that prevent host-nation access or unauthorized detonation, the memo warned that the USAF custodial units are operating on emergency base power and rations, completely cut off from municipal logistics by European host authorities.

The memorandum evaluated four specific Courses of Action (COAs):

* **COA 1: Non-Cooperative Airborne Extraction (Forceful Recovery).** Deploying special tactics teams and C-17 Globemaster transports under fighter escort to seize base runways and airlift the weapons out without European clearance. The Joint Staff and EUCOM planners unanimously advised against this option, designating it militarily unfeasible without initiating open, lethal combat against allied forces. German and Dutch Patriot PAC-3 and surface-to-air batteries ringing the bases would require pre-emptive kinetic suppression, turning an extraction into a shooting war on NATO territory.
* **COA 2: Emergency Execution of Command Disable (CDS).** Ordering USAF MUNSS teams to initiate the Command Disable System on all WS3 vaults. This non-nuclear destructive protocol would trigger internal thermal and electronic destruction of the warheads' firing circuits, coded switches, and physics assemblies, reducing the B61s to inert, non-functional metal and uranium scrap. While completely denying the weapons to any foreign entity, the memo noted this would permanently destroy America's forward nuclear infrastructure in Europe without recovering the assets.
* **COA 3: Hardened Custodial Standoff and Diplomatic Leverage (Secretary's Recommendation).** Maintaining strict physical custody within the hardened vaults, enforcing zero-access rules of engagement at the shelter doors, and using the unresolved presence of the warheads as strategic leverage against European capitals in wider negotiations over sovereign asset freezes and Greenland supply corridors.
* **COA 4: The NATO Consultation Compromise.** Signing the single-page formal assurance requested by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte promising prior consultation before warhead removal, thereby unlocking host-nation flight clearances and allowing orderly, peaceful airlift of the B61 stockpiles back to the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas.

In his formal executive summary, Secretary Hegseth advised the President to adopt COA 3 as the active posture while holding COA 2 (Command Disable) strictly as an emergency fallback if host-nation forces attempt to breach the WS3 vault doors. Hegseth explicitly recommended against armed tactical extraction, warning that attempting to shoot a way through German or Dutch airfield barricades would cross an irrevocable threshold and trigger immediate, catastrophic armed conflict with European states.

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